Accretion and Severed Mineral Estates
"See how this river comes me cranking in,
And cuts me from the best of all my land

.

William Shakespearet
The Yellowstone River runs through one of the richest oil fields in
Montana. For nearly a century, developers have owned the minerals below the lands bordering the river, while the state claims the
land beneath the river itself.' In recent years there have been disputes over the ownership of these minerals among the developers,
the state, and other property owners along the river. The problem
is the shifting riverbed: since 1884, when the area was first surveyed, the river has narrowed and moved to the east.2 Vast quantities of oil and gas, originally located to the east of the river, now lie
beneath the river itself, or to the west.
Under the ancient common law doctrine of accretion, title to
property contiguous to a waterway such as the Yellowstone River
changes in accordance with the river's movements. And although
the law of accretion developed in the context of surface property
rights, two recent state supreme courts have decided that the doctrine of accretion also applies to the severed ownership of minerals
beneath the surface.3 The consequences of these rulings are substantial. In the Yellowstone River dispute, the original owners lost
mineral estates of significant value.4 In other cases, accretion may
force mineral lessees to drill additional wells to protect their leases,
or may cause them to lose their leases altogether. The operators of
mines or wells may become subject to suits for trespass and conversion, and production from those wells or mines could be inter-

1 Henry IV, act 3, sc. 1, lines 97-98.
' See Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 408 (Mont. 1983). The Yellowstone
is considered a navigable river, thus giving the state title to the riverbed. Id. at 408.
2 See id. at 407.
' See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.

" See Jackson, 667 P.2d at 407. In 1905 there were only 1.81 acres of land west of the
Yellowstone River in the section disputed in Jackson. By 1975 there were approximately
159 acres of land west of the river in the same section. Id. The dispute in Jackson was not
so much over ownership of the 159 acres, but over ownership of the thousands of cubic acres
of minerals beneath that land.
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rupted until the disputes are resolved.
This comment argues that the doctrine of accretion should not
be applied to mineral estates that have been severed from surface
estates. Rather, the subsurface boundary should be determined by
survey when the mineral estate is severed, and that boundary
should remain fixed regardless of any subsequent change in the
surface boundary caused by shifting boundary waters. Part I of the
comment provides a brief overview of the doctrine of accretion and
discusses the cases that have applied the doctrine to severed mineral estates. Part II considers several possible barriers to the adoption of a fixed-boundary rule and assesses the relative merits of
that rule and the doctrine of accretion.
I.

ACCRETION AND MINERAL ESTATES IN THE COURTS

The doctrine of accretion confers exclusive title on a landowner to lands gradually and imperceptibly added to his property
by the movement of a river, lake, or sea.5 The doctrine of erosion
takes from a landowner title to lands lost owing to the encroachment of such waters. The two doctrines are necessarily correlative,
1 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 173 (1918); Missouri v. Nebraska, 196
U.S. 23, 34-36 (1904); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 360-61 (1892); Jackson, 667 P.2d at
407. See generally 7 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 983, at 607-11
(rev. ed. 1984) (defining accretion).
The doctrine of accretion can be traced to the Romans. See INST. JuST. 2.1.20; INST.
GAIus 2.70. Blackstone credited Bracton with adopting the Roman e-trine of alluvion into
the English common law around 1260 A.D. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261-62; see
also BRACTON, 1 DE LEGIBUS ET CoNsunruDINMus ANGLIAE ch. 2, at 69-70 (T. Twiss ed. 1878)
(1st ed. n.p. 1569); Recent Decisions, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 683 (1924) (doctrine of alluvion
"was taken bodily from the Roman law"). From those origins, the doctrine has taken root
throughout the common law world. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 360-61 (1892)
(United States); Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia, 1982 A.C. 706, 715
(P.C.) (Australia); Eliason v. Registrar, 115 D.L.R.3d 360, 362 (Alta. Q.B. 1980) (Canada);
Penang v. Beng Hong Oon, 1972 A.C. 425 (P.C.) (Malaysia); Attorney-General of S. Nigeria
v. John Holt & Co., 1915 A.C. 599, 611-12 (P.C.) (Southern Nigeria).
Accretions are of two kinds: alluvion and reliction (or dereliction). Alluvion is land created by the deposit of silt and debris from a body of water. See, e.g., United States v.
Claridge, 279 F. Supp. 87, 88-89 (D. Ariz. 1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970). Reliction or dereliction is land added when a body of water
withdraws or recedes, thereby leaving a portion of its bed dry. See, e.g., Fontenelle v.
Omaha Tribe, 298 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Neb. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970). See
generally Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 ARiz. L. REv. 315, 321-24 (1972) (discussing kinds of accretion). Technically, accretion refers to the process or act by which alluvions and relictions are created, and not to the
alluvions or relictions themselves. However, the term is often used as a noun synonymous
with alluvion and reliction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19, 70, 1161 (5th ed. 1979).
6 Jackson, 667 P.2d at 407; see also Oklahoma v. Texas, 268 U.S. 252, 256 (1925). Erosion is the gradual eating away of the soil by currents or tides. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 486
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since to apply one without the other would result in dual ownership of property. The term accretion thus may be used to refer to
7
the combined effect of both doctrines.
When a river is not navigable, the boundary between the estates on either side is typically set at the river's center line.' The
doctrine of accretion maintains the boundary at that line even as
the river moves, although the acreage of one estate may increase
and that of the other may decrease. 9 When the river is navigable,
the state will often hold title to the riverbed.10 Privately owned
riparian estates will then extend to either the high-water mark or
the low-water mark on each side of the river, depending on the law
of the jurisdiction." In that situation, the doctrine of accretion op-

(5th ed. 1979).
7 The doctrine of avulsion, not accretion, applies when a change in a river's course is
sudden and perceptible. Under the doctrine of avulsion, a sudden change in the course of a
riverbed does not affect the boundaries of riparian land. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143
U.S. 359, 361 (1892).
It can be difficult to determine whether a shift in a river is accretive or avulsive. The
Roman jurist Gaius required the change to be so slow ut oculos nostros fallat (as to fail our
sight). INsT. GAIus 2.70. Justinian's code of laws said the process must be so slow ut intelligere non possis, quantum quoque momento temporis adiciatur (as knowledge is not had
how much is added in a moment). INST. JusT. 2.1.20. In a famous case, Chief Justice Abbott
noted that an extremely minute accretion "may become, by gradual increase, perceptible
at the end of a century, or even forty or fifty years," and suggested that an accretive
shift must be "imperceptible in its progress, not imperceptible after a long lapse of time."
King v. Lord Yarborough, 3 B. & C. 91, 106-07, 107 Eng. Rep. 668, 674 (K.B. 1824), af'd, 2
Bligh N.S. 147, 1 Dow. & Cl.178, 4 Eng. Rep. 1087 (H.L. 1828); see also County of St. Clair
v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874) (a shift is accretive when, although "witnesses may see
from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the progress
was going on"); Jackson, Alluvio and the Common Law, 99 L.Q. REv. 412, 421-24 (1983).
If actual perceptibility at the moment of accretion is the test, then the ability of the
human eye to detect movement may be the deciding factor. At the distance of five feet (eye
level for one standing on the bank of a river), a movement of one inch per minute is just
under the limit of perceptibility. See Scott & Stevenson, Shore Accretions from the Geographical Standpoint, 10 MIcH. ST. B.J. 215, 228 (1931). Such a movement would produce
an accretion of 120 feet per day, or more than eight miles per year! Scott and Stevenson
note that the fastest reported accretion on a seashore grew at the rate of only 200 feet per
year. Id. at 229.
' See, e.g., City of Missoula v. Bakke, 121 Mont. 534, 539, 198 P.2d 769, 772 (1948);
Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Key Okla. Oil Co., 149 Okla. 262, 265, 299 P. 850, 852
(1931).
' See Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892) (referring to rivers which form the
boundary between two states or nations, the Court observed that "[a]ccretion, no matter to
which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still the centre of the channel"). Quite a
different result would be reached under the doctrine of avulsion. If the river's movement
was avulsive, the boundary would remain fixed where it was when the avulsive shift took
place: at the center line of the former riverbed. Id. Thus, if the river shifted far an owner on
the bank of the old riverbed could lose all access to the river.
10 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409 (low-water mark); Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417,
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erates to maintain the boundaries at the appropriate water-level
mark as the river moves.
At least four rationales have been offered in support of the
doctrine of accretion. 12 First, the doctrine ensures that owners of
land bounded by water will continue to enjoy their riparian rights
and access to water even if the boundary water shifts. Second, the
doctrine awards accretions to the owners of the abutting land, who
are better situated than landowners on the opposing bank to use
the land productively. Third, the doctrine appears to be evenhanded: although it imposes a risk of loss, it also bestows a potential for gain. Finally, the doctrine is thought to be fairly easy for
courts and laymen to apply. 13
In addition to altering the boundaries of property on the surface, the doctrine of accretion can also affect boundaries above and
below the surface. Under the traditional doctrine of property ownership ad coelum, the surface owner controls not only the surface,
but also everything "to the sky and to the depths."1 4 Thus, when
the property above, on, and below the surface is held by a single
owner, it makes intuitive sense for an accretive shift in the surface
boundary also to shift the boundary above and below the surface.
In such a case, not only are the surface benefits of accretion obtained, but the boundary of the property above and below the surface remains unified and identifiable.
However, when the surface and subsurface portions of a piece
of property are not held by a single owner-if the mineral estate
has been severed from the surface by conveyance of legal title or

420-22, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895) (observing that some jurisdictions use the high-water mark
while others use the low-water mark).
'2See, e.g., Beck, The Wandering Missouri River: A Study in Accretion Law, 43
N.D.L. REV. 429, 431-39 (1967); Note, supra note 5, at 322-24; Recent Decisions, supra note
5, at 683; Comments on Recent Cases, Real Property-NavigableRiver-Accretion to Riparian Land, 45 IowA L. REV.945, 948-50 (1960). These rationales are discussed infra at notes
34-66 and accompanying text.
" At least two other less powerful rationales for accretion have been suggested. One is
"an analogy to accession. When a cow produces a calf, generally the calf belongs to the
owner of the cow .... So too to the early more formalistic mind accretion was the creation
of new land and it ought to belong to the owner of the land to which it was added." Beck,
supra note 12, at 432.
Another rationale is the notion that accretion involves small amounts of land that are
"too little to worry about either by a court or someone other than the riparian owner." Id. at
433-34. While that de minimus rationale may be valid in some cases, it does not support the
application of the doctrine in cases where significant amounts of land are involved. Id.
" Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wright, 232 So. 2d 709, 711 (Miss. 1970) (noting that
state and federal authorities "have long since substantially modified that concept").
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lease to another party' 5 -then it is not clear that the doctrine of
accretion should apply to the boundaries of both the surface and
subsurface estates. Because the traditional rationales for the accretion rule relate primarily to the interests of the surface owner,
there is some question whether the boundaries of a severed mineral estate should shift according to accretion on the surface or remain fixed regardless of surface boundary changes.
Only two courts have considered this question. 0 Both courts
concluded that the ownership of severed estates should shift in accordance with accretive changes in the corresponding surface estates. The first case, Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co.,' 7 addressed the
issue in the context of a non-navigable river. In rejecting a fixedboundary rule, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma based its reasoning in part on the axiom that a grantor may not convey an estate
greater than that which he possesses. Because an unsevered estate
is subject to loss by erosion, the court explained, it follows from
the axiom that the owner of an unsevered estate may not convey a
severed mineral estate that is not subject to loss by erosion.' 8
The court also claimed that applying a fixed-boundary rule
would result in "gross inequities" when an unsevered estate is bor"IThe owner of an unsevered estate in fee owns the surface of the land as well as any
minerals beneath it. There are two ways in which a severed mineral estate can be created
from an unsevered estate. The owner of a unsevered estate may convey an interest in the
minerals, retaining an interest in the surface, or may convey an interest in the surface, while
retaining an interest in the minerals. Either transaction creates a severed mineral estate in
fee that is independent of the overlying surface estate. See RICHARD HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3, at 27 (1983); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202.2
(abridged ed. 1973). For a discussion of the principles used to identify the boundaries between surface estates and severed mineral estates, see infra note 40.
For the purposes of this comment, a lease of the mineral estate is equivalent to a conveyance of the minerals. This is true because a mineral lease, unlike other types of leases, is
tantamount to ownership. A mineral lessee typically has the exclusive right to remove the
minerals specified in the lease, and receives full title to the minerals it extracts. It exercises
absolute control over the mineral estate, subject only to contractual obligations in the lease
document. Because the lease typically lasts as long as minerals are produced in significant
quantities, at its termination the owner receives only a depleted estate. The leasehold therefore typically represents a substantial portion, if not the full value of the fee and may deserve legal treatment resembling that of a deed. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,

supra, §§ 202.1, 207 (discussing legal character of mineral leases).
Whether or not a mineral estate has been severed, the owner of the minerals commonly
does not participate directly in the development of the oil and gas reserves. R. HEMINGWAY,
supra, § 2.1, at 33-34. Instead, he usually receives a royalty, which is a share of the production or the proceeds of its sale. The owner may in addition receive a cash consideration. See
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra, § 202.1.
" See Jackson, 667 P.2d at 408; id. at 410 (Davis, J., dissenting).
17 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980).
'8 Id. at 41-42.
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dered by a severed mineral estate.19 According to the court, under
a fixed-boundary rule the severed estate would not be subject to
loss by erosion, and therefore the unsevered estate could never
gain by accretion. However, the court also asserted that the reverse
was not true: the unsevered estate would be subject to loss by erosion, and therefore the severed estate could gain by accretion. The
court argued that such a one-sided result was unfair, and would be
avoided by adopting the doctrine of accretion.2 0
Lastly, the court defended its decision by noting that the
owner of a severed mineral estate would have an implied easement
to go onto the surface and "take measures" to protect against erosion, "given the proper circumstances. "21 The court did not describe what those circumstances would be, nor did it explain what
kinds of measures would be appropriate.2 2
In Jackson v. Burlington Northern Inc.,23 the Supreme Court
of Montana agreed with the result in Nilsen and applied the doctrine of accretion to subsurface estates bordering the Yellowstone
River, a navigable waterway. The Montana court added three reasons for applying the doctrine of accretion to severed mineral estates. First, it observed that a fixed-boundary rule would result in
discrepancies between the surface and subsurface portions of unsevered estates bordering severed mineral estates. 24 Those discrepancies would not be evident from examination of a chain-of-title
record for the unsevered estate; a purchaser relying solely on that
record could incorrectly conclude that his subsurface holdings were
as extensive as his surface holdings.25
" Id. at 42.
20 Id. The court's concern was unfounded, since it was based on an incorrect under-

standing of how a fixed-boundary rule would operate. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
21 Nilsen, 614 P.2d at 42-43. The court noted that the easement would not be implied
if the instrument which created the severed estate specifically prohibited it. Id. at 43.
22 The court also rejected an analogy to adverse possession found persuasive by the
trial court. Adverse possession of all or part of a surface estate has no effect on the title to a
severed mineral estate, unless the adverse possessor interferes with the mineral estate by
mining or drilling. See, e.g., Deruy v. Noah, 199 Okla. 230, 232-33, 185 P.2d 189, 191 (1947).
In the trial court's view, the adverse possession rule indicated that mineral and surface estates are separate and independent after title to the minerals is severed. Therefore, it reasoned that changes in the surface estate, whether by adverse possession or accretion, should
not affect the mineral estate. Nilsen, 614 P.2d at 40-41. Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma insisted that the law of adverse possession has no relevance to
the problem of accretion. Id. at 41 ("[A]dverse possession cases [are] statute of limitations
cases, not property right cases.").
13 667 P.2d 406 (Mont. 1983).
11 Id. at 409.
23

Id.
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To illustrate, suppose A holds an unsevered estate on the east
bank of a river, and B holds a severed mineral estate on the west
bank. Suppose also that the river moves westward, toward the severed estate. Land could not accrete to the subsurface portion of A's
estate because the western edge is the fixed boundary of a severed
mineral estate, which would not be subject to erosion. However,
land could accrete to the surface portion of A's estate, because the
surface estate above B's mineral estate remains subject to erosion.
Eventually, the surface portion of A's estate would extend far
westward of the subsurface portion, even though A has never severed the estates (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Shift of a Non-Navigable Waterway
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Second, the court observed that if severed mineral estates
were not subject to accretion, the state could be divested of its
subsurface lands under navigable rivers.2 6 To illustrate, suppose a
navigable river flows from north to south between an unsevered
estate on the east bank and a severed estate on the west bank.
Suppose also that the river is slowly shifting westward. If the state
has not severed its mineral rights below the riverbed, the doctrine
of accretion would apply to the boundary between the state's holdings and the eastern unsevered estate, while a fixed-boundary rule
would apply to the boundary between the state's holdings and the
estate to the west. As the river moves westward, the surface portion of the state's holdings advances with it, since surface estates
continue to be governed by the doctrine of accretion. However, be28Id.
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cause the subsurface portion of the state's holdings borders a severed estate, its boundary remains fixed and does not advance with
the river. Meanwhile, the unsevered estate to the east advances
westward with the river, gaining land above and below the surface
under the doctrine of accretion. Thus, the state's subsurface holdings are reduced as the river shifts to the west, since its eastern
boundary would be contracting while the western boundary would
remain fixed. Indeed, the state's subsurface holdings could be
squeezed out entirely if the east bank of the river advances past
the original location of the river's west bank. The court argued
that this result would be "clearly contrary" to a state statute that
7
gives the state title to lands under navigable rivers.1
Finally, the court argued that the boundaries of severed mineral estates would be difficult to determine if they were not subject
to the doctrine of accretion.2 8 The court observed that the efficacy
of a i3xed-boundary rule depends on whether a survey was conducted at the time of severance. If not, the movement of the river
would make it difficult to establish where the boundary was located when the estate was severed. The court surmised that the
problem had arisen in the case before it, and added that "other
owners of severed mineral estates might have like difficulties locat29
ing surveys which correspond with pertinent severance dates.
II.

CHOOSING A RULE

The courts' decisions in Nilsen and Jackson identified some of
the problems that might arise if a fixed-boundary rule applies to
severed mineral estates, but failed to identify the problems that
arise if the doctrine of accretion applies. To assess properly
whether the doctrine of accretion should apply to severed mineral
estates, courts must consider three questions. First, does adoption
of a fixed-boundary rule violate traditional rules governing conveyance of property? Second, which rule best promotes the policies
that the doctrine of accretion traditionally serves? And third, does
a fixed-boundary rule conflict with state ownership of land beneath
navigable rivers?

"7
Id.; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-202(1) (1985). For an illustration of how state ownership is affected by movements in navigable waterways under a fixed-boundary rule, see
figure 2 infra at text following note 71; see also infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text
(discussing state ownership of riverbeds).
" Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409.
29

Id.
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The Axiom

The Nilsen court argued that a fixed-boundary rule would violate the "axiomatic principle of law that a grantor cannot convey
an estate greater than that possessed by him":3 0 since the original
unsevered estate is subject to loss by erosion and the severed mineral estate would not be subject to loss by erosion, the owner of the
severed estate would have received a greater estate than the owner
of the unsevered estate possessed."
This argument misconstrues the purposes of the axiom. Historically, the axiom has been directed at the conveyance of estates
of greater legal dignity, such as when the owner of a life estate
attempts to convey a fee simple, or when the owner of a defeasible
fee attempts to convey an indefeasible fee.3 2 In those cases the axiom implements important policies: it protects the original grantor's intent to convey a limited estate and protects holders of remainders, reversions, or other interests in the same property.
However, the axiom has not been applied when opposing policy
concerns are sufficiently implicated. For example, courts have promoted the alienability of property by allowing the conversion of a
fee tail into a fee simple either by conveyance or by common recovery and fine. 3 Barring the entail in this manner destroys a reversionary interest, which is a far greater interest than the possibility
of gain or loss by accretion. This comparison suggests that the axiom alone is insufficient to preserve the accretion rule for severed
mineral estates.
Thus, the argument that the axiom presents an outright bar to
a fixed-boundary rule rests on a mistaken understanding of the nature of common law rules governing transfers of property. Like
"oNilsen,

614 P.2d at 41.

31 It should be noted that the original owner and the owner of the severed mineral

estate could be the same person. Such a situation would arise in cases where the severed
estate was created when the owner of an unsevered estate conveys the surface estate to
another pdrty while retaining the subsurface minerals. See supra note 15. In such cases
there would have been no conveyance of the minerals, and thus technically the axiom would
seem to be inapplicable. However, the Nilsen court implicitly rejected that distinction. See
614 P.2d at 37.
32 See, e.g., Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 214, 79 S.E. 2d 479, 485 (1954) (grantor who
held a life estate cannot convey an estate in fee); Riner v. Fallis, 176 Ky. 575, 578, 195 S.W.
1102, 1103 (1917) (owner of a defeasible fee cannot convey a fee absolute); 2 R. POWEL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 5, T 19012]; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 50 (1936).
33 See, e.g., Mildmay's Case, 6 Coke Rep. 40a, 41a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 314 (K.B. 1607)
("[I]f a man makes a gift in tail, on condition, that he shall not suffer a common recovery
• . . this condition is repugnant to the estate-tail and against law."). For a brief history of
the methods of barring entails, see HERBERT TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 51 (1940).
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those other rules, the axiom is not an irrefutable principle of logic
with universal applicability, but is a convenient justification for results that are desirable from a policy perspective. It therefore begs
the question simply to state mechanically that a fixed-boundary
rule violates the axiom; it is necessary to examine policy considerations in order to determine whether the axiom should apply to the
creation of subsurface estates with fixed boundaries.
B.

Policy Considerations Favoring a Fixed-Boundary Rule

To some degree the Nilsen and Jackson decisions sketch out
the policies that underlie the doctrine of accretion. The courts
have advanced four key arguments in support of applying a rule of
accretion on the surface: (1) the importance of preserving riparian
landowners' access to water; (2) the desirability of awarding accretions to the party who will use them most productively; (3) the
possibility that the potential for gaining land will offset the risk of
losing it; and (4) the ease with which the doctrine can be applied. 4
While these arguments may justify a rule of accretion for surface
boundaries, they would be equally or better served by applying a
fixed-boundary rule to subsurface estates.
1. Access to Water. The most important purpose of the doctrine of accretion is to ensure that riparian landowners will enjoy
continued access to water even if the river shifts away from their
land.3 5 In contrast, under a fixed-boundary rule riparian owners
could lose their access to water as the river shifts, since eventually
a sliver of property could emerge between the river and the fixed
boundary of their land.3 s The significance courts attach to contin34 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

11 This feature of the doctrine of accretion has long been regarded by many courts and
commentators as its most compelling virtue. See, e.g., Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 19798, 53 N.W. 1139, 1142-43 (1893) ("But it seems to us that the rule rests upon a much
broader principle, and has a much more important purpose in view, viz. to preserve the
fundamental riparian right-on which all others depend, and which often constitutes the
principle value of the land-of access to water.") (emphasis in original); 7 R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 5, 983, at 610 ("The basic justification for [the] doctrine . . . is the

desirability of keeping land riparian . . . thus assuring the upland owners access to the
water and the advantages of this contiguity."); Beck, supra note 12, at 436-38; see also Sieck
v. Godsey, 254 Iowa 624, 627, 118 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1962) ("The theory of accretion is that
it permits a riparian owner to continue his access to the shore or water line."). But cf. Comments on Recent Cases, supra note 12, at 949 (when a considerable amount of alluvial land
is involved, a more equitable solution might be "to grant [a] right-of-way over the alluvial
land for the purpose of maintaining the access to the river").
36 See Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 197, 53 N.W. 1139, 1142 (1893) (court discusses
the "incalculable mischiefs that would follow if a riparian owner is liable to be cut off from
access to the water, and another owner sandwiched in between him and it").
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ued access to water is reflected in the way they partition accretions
among riparian owners: courts maintain each owner's original proportionate share of river frontage, even if that requires altering the
relative distribution of acreage."
When viewed in this light, the application of the accretion
doctrine to changes in riparian boundaries can be seen as an attempt to minimize collective risks to land owners. Under the rule
of accretion, a riparian owner is assured of continued access to
water, but runs the risk of losing land; under a fixed-boundary
rule, the owner will not lose land, but runs the risk of losing access
to water.3 8 Since access to water for agricultural, commercial, and
domestic uses is often the "most valuable feature" of riparian
land,3 9 riparian owners are collectively better off under the doctrine of accretion, which maximizes the value of their land by minimizing the risk of losing its most important component. In effect,
courts invoking the "access to water" rationale choose the doctrine
of accretion because it allocates the risks associated with the movement of bodies of water so as to minimize the injustice inflicted on
riparian owners as a whole.
This rationale shows the accretion rule to be compelling as applied to surface boundaries, but it undermines the rule as applied
to severed mineral estates. Most severed mineral estates are located too far below the surface to be contiguous to rivers or lakes,
and thus do not enjoy the benefits associated with contiguity.4 0 If

" See, e.g., Jennings v. Shipp, 115 N.W.2d 12, 15 (N.D. 1962); Beck, supra note 12, at
438-39.
" However, some or all of the land could be submerged.
3' Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381 (1977).
'o The clearest example is an estate of minerals in stratum. In such an estate, a person
has rights to minerals only at certain depths or in certain geological formations. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Mack Oil Co., 376 P.2d 279, 280 (Okla. 1962) (court cancelled lease down to approximately 10,800 feet below the surface, but preserved it below that depth). For example,
one party may own coal in a field between 450 and 700 feet below the surface, another party
may own the coal in the field between 700 and 1000 feet below the surface, and yet another
party may own the oil and gas at depths below 2000 feet. Surface rivers typically will be
hundreds of feet above the estates in coal.
Mineral estates not in stratum are also typically not contiguous to bodies of water on
the surface. There is no clear boundary line between surface and subsurface estates, but
courts have drawn a rough line of division. Generally, a severed mineral estate does not
include minerals that must be removed by methods, such as strip mining or open pit mining, that would leave "the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes ...
destroyed or substantially impaired." Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). Alternatively, some courts hold that any substance within 200 feet of the surface is a "near
surface" substance and therefore pertains to the surface estate. See Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977). Under either
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severed mineral estates do have any rights to surface water, it is
because those rights were expressly reserved or conveyed. 4 In
short, direct access to water, an important asset to the surface
owner, is unimportant to the owner of the mineral estate. Below
the surface, the key factor is continued access to and control over
the minerals themselves-a factor which is only marginally affected by changes in the location of boundary waters on the
surface.
In fact, the most important principle behind the "access to
water" rationale-minimization of collective risk to owners by preserving the most important component of the riparian estate's
value-militates against the doctrine of accretion for severed mineral estates. The choice is between the doctrine of accretion, under
which the owner of a severed mineral estate can either gain or lose
land, and a fixed-boundary rule, under which the owner's holdings
remain constant. From the standpoint of providing incentives to
develop minerals-the primary purpose of severing a mineral estate-the second alternative is better.
This is so because the existence of fixed boundaries for subsurface mineral estates helps to promote the development and exploitation of mineral resources. Under a regime of accretion, shifts
in the surface boundary transfer wealth between subsurface owners
without any relation to either owner's ability to recover or develop
the minerals. The uncertain nature of those transfers increases the
risks involved in developing minerals beneath riparian lands without also increasing the expected returns from development, thus
on the whole discouraging mineral development. In contrast, when
boundaries are fixed, the value of a subsurface mineral deposit will
be more easily ascertainable because it is not subject to arbitrary
change. In the long run, this greater certainty and stability encourages investment in mineral development.
In addition, a fixed-boundary rule may reduce or eliminate
other conflicts or costs existing under a rule of accretion. For example, oil and gas leases usually last for a term of years and "as
long thereafter as oil or gas . . . is produced from [the] land by

approach, severed mineral estates will begin at sufficient depths that they are not likely to
be contiguous to a body of water on the surface.
41 Water, unless severed expressly by conveyance or reservation, belongs to the surface
estate. Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Some
courts have granted to mineral lessees an implied right to use reasonable amounts of underground water for the development and production of minerals. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972); Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 961-62
(Okla. 1964).
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One producing well may preserve the lease on hun-

dreds or thousands of acres. If the well is located on land that is
eroded away from the mineral estate, the lease on the entire property may terminate.
Even if the lessee preserves the lease through production from
other wells on the property, he may incur additional expenses because of an offset well covenant in the lease. An offset well covenant requires a lessee to drill wells to offset drainage from the
property by wells on adjoining lands.43 Where a well once on the
leasehold is lost because of the doctrine of accretion, the lessee
may be obligated to drill a new well to offset production from the
well he had drilled earlier. Failure to do so may make him liable in
damages to the lessor or may terminate the lease for the whole
property-including its other producing wells.
To summarize, the doctrine of accretion as applied to surface
lands protects a valuable asset of ownership-access to water-and
thus tends to minimize the losses that the movement of rivers inflicts on neighboring landowners. However, as applied to subsurface boundaries, accretion has precisely the opposite effect: it
makes landowners and other participants in the mineral extraction
business worse off than they would be under a fixed-boundary rule.
One could argue that the problems associated with an accretion rule can be overcome if the parties negotiate contractual solutions that reduce or eliminate the risks ex ante; modify their behavior to avoid the risks, even though their modified behavior
might be less productive than the path they would otherwise follow; or ignore the risks and litigate to protect their position if conflicts arise. But each of these strategies would itself involve
costs-costs that would not be imposed by a fixed-boundary rule.
2. Productivity. Another common rationale for applying the
doctrine of accretion to changes in surface boundaries is that it
awards accretions to the party that can most productively use
them.44 Early common law authorities recognized that a fixedboundary rule for surface estates could leave landowners with narrow slivers of property between the river's old and new shores. Al42

Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848, 849, 189 P. 920, 921 (1920); see also H.

WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 15, § 202.1.
43 See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 15, §§ 8.5, 8.6; see also Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard

Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444, 446 (10th Cir. 1945).
44 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 12, at 434-35; Note, supra note 5, at 323 & n.46; see also
Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 191 (1890) ("it is the interest of the commu-

nity that all lands should have an owner, and most convenient that insensible additions to
the shore should follow the title to the shore").

1986]

Accretion and Severed Estates

though they might grow larger with further movements, small
strips of land were thought to be of little use to the original holder.
By shifting the neighbor's boundary in accordance with the river's
movements, the doctrine of accretion grants the narrow strip to the
most productive user-the owner of the contiguous estate.4"
This rationale is largely inapplicable to severed mineral estates. Barring unusually difficult terrain, small changes in the surface boundary create no inaccessible or unproductive slivers of
subsurface property. Rather, with modern slant drilling or mining
technology, the owner of a mineral estate still can reach and remove the minerals even if the shifting riverbed impedes direct access to the subsurface estate.4 6
Moreover, the holder of a severed mineral estate is likely to be
the most productive user of the subsurface rights. There is little
incentive to retain or purchase a subsurface estate except to develop its minerals. Thus, the holder of the severed estate often will
have already begun to formulate plans and invest in measures specifically aimed at developing these subsurface minerals.
The accretion doctrine poses a threat to the severed mineral
estate-and thus to the party that is often the most productive
user-because changes in the surface boundary could make the
subsurface holder into a trespasser both above and below the surface. The extraction of subsurface minerals requires the construction of a variety of fixtures, such as wells or mine shafts, that may
be located on and below the surface. If title to the land in which
those fixtures are located changes hands with a shift in surface waters, the party that is currently developing the subsurface minerals
could become liable to the new owners of the land for trespass and
conversion.' Inadvertent trespasses could occur even where wells
are not located on the surface of the accreted property; if wells are
drilled at an angle, the subsurface boundary could shift across the
lower portions of the wells, giving rise to a claim of trespass against

45 See, e.g., The King v. Lord Yarborough, 2 Bligh N.S. 147, 1 Dow. & Cl. 178, 4 Eng
Rep. 1087 (H.L. 1828) (Best, C.J., delivering the advice of the judges to the House of Lords).
46 An owner of a mineral estate typically gains access through the surface estate wnthe

grantor. Cf. Kemmerer v. Midland Oil & Drilling Co., 229 F. 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1915) (grant
of a right in subsurface implies right of access).
4*1 See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 15, §§ 225-27; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp,
253 Ky. 552, 555, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (1934) (inadvertent trespasser liable for damages
and may take no profit from operations); Champlin Refining Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum
Corp., 205 Okla. 524, 525, 238 P.2d 827, 828 (1951) (accounting for conversion of oil and
gas); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (suit in assumpsit for reasonable value of use and occupation when defendants performed unauthorized seismological tests on mineral estate).
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some part of the fixtures.48 If oil and gas are produced from the
well after it comes to be bottomed on adjoining property, the mineral owner may be liable for the full value of all oil produced. 49
A fixed-boundary rule applied to severed mineral estates protects the holder of the subsurface estate against this threat by not
allowing the boundary to move and transform a subsurface fixture
into a trespass. 0 Avoiding this risk could result in significant savings. Lawsuits would involve complicated legal and factual issues,
such as when the trespass first occurred and what should be done
with the trespassing fixtures. The money spent to resolve those issues is money the parties would not have to spend under a fixedboundary rule. In addition, the risk of suit itself may deter developers from installing fixtures at locations that might otherwise be
optimal. 51
48 For example, assume a case in which A and B are neighboring landowners, and A has

drilled a well at an angle so that the bottom of the well is located several hundred feet closer
to B's land than is the surface perforation. Under the doctrine of accretion, the boundary
between A's and B's land could shift so that although the surface perforation would still be
on A's property, the well would be bottomed on B's property and A would therefore be
liable for trespass and conversion.
"' See, e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 205 Okla. 524, 238
P.2d 827 (1951).
" Under a fixed-boundary rule, fixtures on the surface might seem to become trespassers through the accretion of land along the property boundary. In this situation, however, a
developer could be granted an implied easement of access from the surface to the mineral
estate below. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
Another way to protect the rights of subsurface holders, as suggested by the Nilsen
court, would be to allow them to make surface modifications to prevent the river from moving. In Nilsen, the court indicated that it would find an implied easement for this purpose.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Under such an easement, the mineral owner
could influence the watercourse by erecting levees, dikes, and other devices to prevent erosion. But the cost of such preventive measures would be enormous where large tracts of land
are involved. And whatever the cost, it would be an additional expense that would not be
required under a fixed-boundary rule.
Furthermore, these measures could substantially interfere with the surface owner's
rights to possess and control the land on the river bank, and possibly with his access to the
water as well. See Nilsen, 614 P.2d at 44 (Doolin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("This, I suggest, makes the surface estate subservient to and burdened with a dominant
tenement of an unprecedented nature . . . . Has the mineral owner been afforded species
(sic) of private eminent domain?"); Note, Oil and Gas: The Inapplicabilityof Accretion to
Severed Mineral Estates, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 826, 832 (1981) ("Such an infringement upon the
rights of the surface owner is both unprecedented and unwarranted."). If such a broad easement is necessary for the fair application of the accretion rule to severed mineral estates,
then the rule is stood on its head-as applied to severed mineral estates, the doctrine would
allow the subsurface owner substantially to undermine the surface riparian rights that the
rule was originally designed to preserve.
"1 Developers might try to negotiate an arrangement with their neighbors under which
the neighbors would waive all claims if a dispute subsequently arose. However, any such
negotiations would involve costs that would not be incurred under a fixed-boundary rule.
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A different problem arises in the more unusual possibility that
a shifting surface boundary would divest the subsurface holder of
any access to the original surface estate. The new surface owner
then could attempt to destroy the value of the severed mineral estate by refusing to grant access to the surface. If the surface owner
could do this, the subsurface holder would no longer be the most
productive user. However, the holder of a severed mineral estate is
typically granted an implied easement to bring minerals to the surface.5 2 This easement is not merely a private contractual right
binding only against the party that granted the severance, but is
assumed to be part of the subsurface estate, and "rights implied
from the grant are implied by law in all conveyances of the mineral
estate .. absent an express limitation thereon. ' 53 By recognizing
the continued enforceability of this easement against the party
who takes surface lands under the doctrine of accretion, courts
would prevent the disjunction between the estates on and below
54
the surface from affecting the value of the subsurface holding.
Even in these extreme cases, then, the fixed-boundary rule would
protect the rights of subsurface holders, who are already in a
strong position and have strong incentives to develop the minerals.
3. Reciprocity. A third rationale for applying the doctrine of
accretion to surface estates centers on its seemingly evenhanded
operation. 55 The Supreme Court observed in 1874 that "[t]he
owner takes the chances of injury and of benefit arising from the
situation of the property. If there be a gradual loss, he must bear
it; if a gradual gain, it is his."5 6 Commentators have criticized this
rationale as being circular, since the fact that the risks posed by

5'See, e.g., Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 231-32, 4 So. 350, 352-53 (1888); Union
Producing Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, 432-33, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (1962); Tenneco Oil Co.
v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1396-97 (Okla. 1973); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Williams, 420
S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967); see also H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 15, § 218.
53Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972).
In implying that the subsurface holder has an easement to gain access to the surface,
courts often refer to the subsurface estate as the "dominant" estate and to the surface estate as the "servient" estate. See, e.g., id. at 810; id. at 816 (Daniels, J., dissenting). Yet this
language may overstate the relations between the surface and subsurface holders. The implied easement is limited in scope to "reasonable use," or use "as is reasonably necessary to

effectuate the purposes of the lease." Id. at 810-11; see also id. at 817-22 (Daniels, J., dissenting); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 15, §§ 218.7, 218.8. In essence, it represents
an accommodation between the surface and subsurface holders that will protect the rights of
each to the greatest possible extent.
11 See, e.g., Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189 (1890); County of St.
Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68-69 (1874); Beck, supra note 12, at 436-37;
Note, supra note 5, at 323-34 & n.48.

5'Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 69.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:232

accretion may be offset by a potential for gain does not demonstrate that accretion is superior to other rules which would impose
different risks or no risks at all.5 7 Thus perhaps this rationale is
best understood as stating the negative argument that accretion is
no less fair than other possible rules.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma invoked this reciprocity rationale when it rejected a fixed-boundary rule in Nilsen. The court
assumed that where a river separates a severed mineral estate and
an unsevered estate, the severed estate could gain land by virtue of
accretion, but could not lose it by virtue of erosion. Thus it concluded that
a fixed-boundary rule would result in "gross
'
58
inequities.
However, the Oklahoma court misunderstood how a fixedboundary rule would operate. The fixed-boundary rule sets a permanent boundary that remains in place regardless of any shift in
the surface boundary owing to accretion.5 9 As such, it does not
merely protect against encroachments by neighboring landowners,
but also confines the holder of the subsurface rights within the
limits of the fixed boundary, with no possibility of expansion.
Thus, insofar as subsurface mineral rights are concerned, the rule
is perfectly evenhanded-neither side stands to gain or lose. And
because the rule of accretion still governs changes in surface
boundaries, the equal distribution of gain and loss between surface
owners is maintained.
4. Ease of Application. The final and critical factor to be
considered is the relative ease with which the two rules can be fol-

11 See Beck, supra note 12, at 436-37; Comments on Recent Cases, supra note 12, at
950.

" 614 P.2d at 42; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
To illustrate, suppose that a non-navigable river flowing from north to south forms
the boundary between an unsevered estate on the eastern bank and a surface estate overlying a severed mineral estate on the western bank. Consider two situations, one in which the
river shifts towards the west and another in which the river shifts towards the east. In the
first situation, the surface estate on the western bank will be eroded, and the unsevered
estate will gain that land on the surface by accretion. However, the boundary between the
severed mineral estate and the corresponding subsurface portion of the unsevered estate
remains fixed. Thus the surface portion of the unsevered estate will extend farther westward
than will the subsurface portion.
In the second situation, the river shifts towards the east. The Nilsen court apparently
thought that the unsevered estate would be subject to erosion along its entire western
boundary, from the surface to the center of the earth. However, the fixed-boundary rule
proposed in this comment would in effect divide the unsevered estate into surface and subsurface portions, corresponding to the division between the surface estate and severed mineral estate on the western bank of the river. Although the surface portion of the unsevered
estate would lose land by accretion, the boundary between the subsurface portion and the
adjoining severed estate would remain fixed.
59
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lowed by laymen and applied by courts. The advantages of a fixedboundary rule could evaporate if it is difficult to establish and
maintain. For surface lands, some courts have argued that the cost
of administering a fixed-boundary rule justifies adoption of the
doctrine of accretion.6 0 Similarly, the Jackson court pointed to administrative costs as a reason for rejecting a fixed-boundary rule
below the surface.
In particular, the Jackson court observed that under a rule
which fixes the boundaries of a severed mineral estate, the surface
portion of an unsevered estate can extend beyond the estate's subsurface portion." Such a discrepancy would arise where there is an
unsevered estate on one side of a river and a surface estate overlying a severed mineral estate on the other. If the river moves toward
the severed estates, then the unsevered estate's surface portion expands while its subsurface portion remains fixed. Similarly, if the
river moves toward the unsevered estate, then the surface of the
severed estate expands while the subsurface estate remains fixed.
This discrepancy gives rise to two concerns. First, a fixedboundary rule for subsurface estates may be harder for laymen to
apply, since the clear river boundary on the surface no longer demarcates the severed mineral estate. But modern courts have rejected the notion that a river that was once a boundary must always be a boundary. The doctrine of avulsion is a good example.
The Romans treated accretive action and avulsive action alike, always preserving the river as a natural boundary.6 2 In contrast, the
common law has recognized that the river does not remain the
property line when changes in its course are sudden; instead, the
boundary stays fixed in accordance with the old riverbed, as identified by survey. 3 This doctrine undermines the bright-line nature
of the river as a boundary, but certainly is more fair to landowners:
they risk losing a little here and there to preserve their riparian
60

See, e.g., Southern Centre of Theosophy, Inc. v. South Australia, 1982 A.C. 706, 716

(P.C.) ("it is manifestly convenient to continue to regard the boundary between land and
water as being where it is from day to day or year to year"); cf. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S.
359, 365-66 (1892) (quoting Vattel that "nothing is more natural than to take a river for a
boundary"); Beck, supra note 12, at 433. But see Comments on Recent Cases, supra note
12, at 949-50 (agreeing that the administrative costs argument is made by courts, but finding it a bad argument).
*, Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409; see supra note 59 and text following note 25.
42 See RUDOLF SOHM, THE INsTrrUTEs 323 (J. Ledhe trans. 3d ed. 1970); Note, supra
note 5, at 322-23 & n.45 ("The adoption of the de minimus concept set the stage for a legal
distinction between gradual and sudden changes along waterways. No such distinction was
drawn in Roman law.").
'3 See supra note 7.
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rights, but they do not expect to lose all their land in one day. 4
Similarly, the fixed boundary of a severed mineral estate is just as
easily established by survey, and the rule furthers the important
policy of promoting mineral development.
Second, a fixed-boundary rule could create practical problems
arising from the disjunction between the surface and subsurface
estates. This discrepancy would not be apparent in a search of the
chain of title of the unsevered estate.6 5 As a result, a potential purchaser of the unsevered estate would have to take a few more steps
in order to identify the extent of his subsurface holdings. The purchaser would have to search the title of the neighboring property
to determine whether a mineral estate had been severed. If it had,
the potential buyer would have to conduct a survey to establish the
relationship between the present surface boundary and the (fixed)
subsurface boundary.
Yet these costs are insufficient to justify rejection of a fixedboundary rule. All purchasers will, as a matter of course, search
the title of the land they intend to buy; it would require little extra
expense to search the title of neighboring property at the same
time. And because the doctrine of accretion will continue to apply
to surface estates, the purchasers of land abutting a river are likely
to conduct surveys anyway to determine the extent to which the
surface boundary has changed since the original conveyance of the
property. In light of the potential benefits of a fixed-boundary rule,
these additional costs do not place an unreasonable burden on purchasers of riparian land.
The Jackson court also identified another potentially more
troubling area of concern: a fixed-boundary rule is difficult to apply if no survey was conducted at the time the affected mineral
estate was severed. 68 In such a situation the river might shift hundreds of yards over the course of many decades before a dispute
arises about the location of the boundary.
This problem should not arise with severances made after the
adoption of a fixed-boundary rule, since landowners and purchasers of mineral estates would be aware of the rule and would conduct surveys at the time of severance. Courts can encourage land-

6 Interestingly, in many cases the evidence on whether a shift in a river was accretive
or avulsive is not established by whether eyewitnesses could perceive the shift in the river,
but by periodic surveys of the riverbed. See, e.g., Ellis v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 630 P.2d 306,
309 (Okla. 1981).
65 Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409.
68 Id.
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owners to conduct surveys by adopting common law rules that
penalize those who fail to do so. Courts might, for example, estop
the owner of the severed estate from challenging the location of a
surface boundary if the owner had failed to survey within a certain
period after severance.
The application of a fixed-boundary rule to severances made
before the adoption of the rule poses further but by no means insuperable difficulties. In cases where no survey was conducted at
the time of severance, the boundary could be determined by the
first survey conducted after the severance. For example, suppose a
mineral estate was severed in 1890. A river bounds this estate on
one side, and the estate on the other side of this river is unsevered.
The river shifted some distance by 1920, when it was surveyed as
part of a periodic government survey of the area. The river shifted
even farther by 1985, when a boundary dispute arose. Under the
approach suggested here, the boundary between the two estates
would be the centerline of the river as established in the 1920 survey. In effect, the doctrine of accretion would apply to boundary
changes that occurred before the survey, and a fixed-boundary rule
would apply to the changes since that time.
C.

Navigable Rivers

The previous section has shown that a rule that fixes the
boundary of a subsurface mineral estate at the time of severance is
preferable to a rule that requires the boundary to move in accord
with accretion on the surface. Policy considerations indicate that a
fixed-boundary rule would benefit both the parties and the public
when the parties share a common boundary consisting of a nonnavigable waterway.
The analysis changes, however, if the boundary river is navigable, because a third party-the state-often holds title to the land
beneath navigable rivers. 67 As the Jackson court suggested, a fixedboundary rule could conflict with this doctrine of state ownership
because a shift of a navigable river towards a severed mineral estate could divest the state of its interest in the minerals beneath
the riverbed. 88
This possibility, however, is not substantial enough to over17 See, e.g., Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 505, 234 P.2d 446, 448 (1951); State v.
Raymond, 254 Iowa 828, 831, 119 N.W.2d 135, 137 (1963); Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75,
80 (Mo. 1960). But see, e.g., Hall v. Alford, 114 Mich. 165, 167-68, 72 N.W. 137, 138 (1897);
Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 580, 586-88, 109 N.W. 744, 746-47 (1906).
68 Jackson, 667 P.2d at 408-09.
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come the other advantages of the fixed-boundary rule. To begin
with, it is worth noting that the state could be divested of subsurface rights only in very limited circumstances: where a navigable
river lies between a severed mineral estate and an unsevered estate, and the river shifts far enough to lie entirely above the severed mineral estate. 9 This possibility does not arise if neither of
the estates bordering the navigable river has severed the mineral
rights, nor if both have severed the mineral rights. It also does not
arise where the river is shifting toward the unsevered estate. Finally, the state can always fix the boundary of the subsurface estate by severing its mineral rights beneath the riverbed, thus protecting them against encroachments from the adjoining estates on
either side of the river.
These scenarios raise a number of points. First, the possibility
that the state could be divested of subsurface rights does not show
that the fixed-boundary rule treats the state unfairly. This possibility of loss is balanced by an equivalent potential for gain: if the
navigable river moves away from a severed estate toward an unsevered estate, the state would gain title to all the subsurface lands
traversed by the river (see figure 2).1o Thus, the fixed-boundary
rule for subsurface estates operates just as the accretion rule does
for surface estates: it bestows equal risk of loss and gain, and
leaves open the more remote possibility that enough of a shift in
the riverbed could strip title to an estate from its current holder
71
altogether.

" For a description of how this would occur, see supra text following note 26 and figure 2 infra at text following note 71.
70 To further illustrate how a fixed-boundary rule would operate in the context of navi-

gable rivers, return to the situation in which a river flows from north to south and is slowly
shifting eastward. First, assume that the estates on both sides of the river are unsevered. In
this situation, the doctrine of accretion would apply.
Second, assume that mineral estates have been severed on both sides of the river. As
the river moves eastward, the surface portion of the state's unsevered estate moves eastward
to remain coextensive with the river. The western surface estate also gains land by accretion. The subsurface portion of the state's land, however, remains fixed at the original location of the river bed. This occurs because the eastern mineral estate cannot lose land by
erosion. The boundary between it and the state's subsurface land therefore remains at the
same location.
Finally, assume there is a severed estate on the western bank, and an unsevered estate
to the east. As the river moves eastward, both the state's surface and subsurface portions
gain land by accretion. The western surface estate gains land by accretion, while the western
boundary of the subsurface portion of the state's estate remains fixed. Thus, the state's
subsurface estate grows in size as the river moves to the east. This scenario is illustrated in
figure 2.
71 On balance, the state's risk of gain or loss under the fixed-boundary rule is quite
favorable. The most the state stands to lose is the subsurface rights beneath the riverbed
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Figure 2: How State Ownership is Affected by Shift of a Navigable
Waterway
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The fixed-boundary rule is not only fair to the state, but may
be more advantageous to the state than a simple accretion rule.
Under an accretion rule, state subsurface rights are particularly
vulnerable. Unlike subsurface rights possessed by riparian estates,
the mineral rights beneath a riverbed will be altered if the river
moves in either direction. Thus, if the state holds title to valuable
subsurface rights below a riverbed, its ability to develop these particular rights on its own or to sell them to some other party is beitself, and of course the state can always protect its rights by severing the subsurface estate.
Yet the state could gain subsurface rights as far as the river may shift. This potential gain
often will be greater than the potential loss insofar as a shifting riverbed often traverses a
stretch of ground that is broader than the width of the riverbed itself.
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set by uncertainty. This extra risk reduces the value of the state's
rights. In contrast, a fixed-boundary rule allows the state to protect and make certain its subsurface rights. By severing the mineral estate, the state can defend itself against encroachments by
it reaps the bounties of
adjoining estates, and also can assure that
72
particularly valuable subsurface rights.
Nonetheless, in raising the problem of state ownership, the
Jackson court may have been responding to a narrower concern.
Quite apart from whether the fixed-boundary rule operates in a
manner that is fair to the state, the possibility that the state could
be divested of subsurface rights beneath a navigable river may conflict with a statutory mandate that the state hold title to those
73
rights.
This concern seems unwarranted for several reasons. First, the
rule that the state owns lands under navigable waterways derives
from ancient common law rules7 4 designed to preserve the waters
for navigation and to keep the channel clear of obstacles to navigation.75 That purpose is adequately served where the state retains a
surface estate that is coextensive with the riverbed and shifts with
it. Since the only interest the state has in the minerals under the
riverbed is proprietary, and has nothing to do with maintaining the
river for transportation and commerce, there seems little reason
for placing its ownership of those minerals on a footing different
from private ownership.
In addition, although some states have codified the rule of
state ownership, 6 it is not obvious why codification should affect
the application of the rule. A law that grants ownership of lands
beneath navigable rivers to the state allows the state to protect
navigational rights of the public at large, and clarifies what might
otherwise be a source of dispute. Such a law does not indicate,
2 This point underscores one primary effect of the fixed-boundary rule: it provides an

incentive for any holder of an unsevered estate to sever the mineral rights if they are believed to have any significant value.
See Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409.
See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336-39 (1876) (construing Iowa law); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
75 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894); Barney, 94 U.S. at 337-38; see also
Note, supra note 5, at 317-20 (suggesting that in the older English common law the king's
title to the beds of navigable waterways was based on "historical peculiarities" having to do
with the tidal nature of English waters, but that American common law introduced greater
emphasis on the state's role in preserving the navigability of waterways).
7' See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-202 (1985) ("The state is the owner of. . . all
land below the water of a navigable lake or stream."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.01.004
(1962) ("Public lands of the state of Washington . . . include . . . the beds of navigable
waters belonging to the state.").
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however, that the state holds title to these lands without regard to
the common law rules that define the rights to possess, use, and
dispose of property.7 7 For example, if the state leased the mineral
estate below its riverbed to a private party, the statute would not
allow it to break the lease merely on the ground that it has title to
those subsurface lands. Furthermore, if the river underwent a sudden avulsive movement, common law doctrines normally would
leave the previous boundaries intact, so that the state would keep
title to the subsurface lands under the old riverbed and would not
hold title to the lands beneath the river's new channel.7 s Similarly,
the existence of a statute should not affect the application of the
fixed-boundary rule to severed mineral estates.
Nonetheless, if a court concludes that the statute mandates
that it preserve the state's title to the subsurface minerals, it could
rule that severance of a mineral estate on either side of the
riverbed fixes the subsurface boundaries on both sides of the
riverbed. Although this rule would treat state ownership differently
from private ownership, it would prevent any possibility of the
state losing its subsurface estate. Moreover, as when the state itself
severs the minerals, the increased certainty in the state's title will
promote the development of the state's mineral estates under navigable rivers.
Two final concerns under a fixed-boundary rule are that the
state might come to own a mineral estate that does not lie beneath
a navigable waterway, and that the state might fail to own subsurface rights below a navigable waterway.7 9 But these concerns are

11 One commentator has argued that states hold property rights such as title to waterlands in trust for the public. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrinein Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). However, even this strong
"public trust" orientation does not require that the state always hold full title to such lands
regardless of common law rules: "The cases stand for the more limited proposition that the
state cannot give to private parties such title that those private interests will be empowered
to delimit or modify public uses." Id. at 527. This goal can be achieved if the state retains a
surface easement over navigable waterways to protect navigational and other rights enjoyed
by the public. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
78 See Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1,
15, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (1975) (avulsion does not affect land boundaries and does not give title
to the state over lands abruptly flooded); Dickinson v. Fund for the Support of Free Public
Schools, 95 N.J. 65, 77, 469 A.2d 1, 7 (1983) ("the State may have no claim to upland that
became tidally flooded because of avulsion or some artificially created condition"); In re
City of Buffalo, 206 N.Y. 319, 325, 99 N.E. 850, 852 (1912) (an owner's loss of land by
avulsion does not return to the ownership of the state, but the boundaries remain where
they were before "the sudden or violent action of the elements"); City of Corpus Christi v.
Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (applying arguendo the rule of avulsion
to tidal lands held by the state).
79 This would occur whenever the state severed mineral rights beneath a riverbed that
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minor. States may own mineral estates that are not located under
rivers, and these subsurface estates are not especially difficult to
locate by survey. Moreover, an avulsive movement of a river could
produce the same result; even if the river moved a considerable
distance, the state's mineral estate would remain fixed in place.
The state still would retain as much control over the navigable
river as would be necessary to meet its obligation to preserve the
river for public navigation. This control would always include the
power to improve the watercourse for navigational purposes, even
where its projects interfere with private development of mineral
estates beneath the river's surface.80
CONCLUSION

The extraction of minerals is a complex enterprise. Under the
doctrine of accretion, the participants in that enterprise are required to make costly readjustments in their contractual relationships and property interests when a boundary shifts. For surface
estates, those costs might be worth incurring in order to maintain
landowners' access to water or to ensure that accretions are
awarded to the party which will make the most productive use of
them. However, those justifications are not applicable to mineral
rights below the surface. Indeed, the movement of surface waters is
essentially irrelevant to a rational system of subsurface ownership
rights.
Instead, analysis of several factors indicates that adoption of a
fixed-boundary rule for severed mineral estates is the better alternative. Under this rule, the doctrine of accretion would continue to
govern changes in boundaries between surface estates or unsevered
mineral estates. However, once a mineral estate is severed from the
surface estate, its boundary would be fixed regardless of future
changes in surface boundaries. Although, as two state courts have

later shifted away from its original channel. It could also occur if the state's subsurface
estate were fixed in place by the severance of contiguous mineral estates.
so See, e.g., State v. Superior Court ex rel. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 226-32, 172 Cal. Rptr.
696, 705-09, 625 P.2d 239, 248-52 (recognizing that private ownership of lake property between the high-water and low-water marks is "impressed with the public trust," which allows the public to make various uses of the waters and lands, and allows the owner to make
any use of the lands "not incompatible with the public's interest in the property"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); cf. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53, 62, 70 (1913) (ownership of bank or bed of river is subordinate to the public right of
navigation).
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correctly recognized, there are some practical difficulties in the application of a fixed-boundary rule, in the long run those problems
are outweighed by the rule's advantages.
Robert L. Kimball

